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WHAT ROLE RELIGION SHOULD PLAY (OR NOT
PLAY) IN OUR PUBLIC POLICY'
NADINE STROSSEN
2
This I would like to thank everyone at the Thomas M. Cooley
Law School for their hard work in putting together this impressive
program. Special thanks go to Sam Bhimani, the Symposium Editor
of the Thomas M Cooley Law Review, who has been so responsive to
my many communications throughout the planning process.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS CONCERNING EQUALITY AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY INHERENT IN GOVERNMENT FUNDING OF
PERVASIVELY SECTARIAN INSTITUTIONS
Sam and his colleagues have asked me to focus on the important
issue of what is often called "faith-based funding," channeling
taxpayer dollars to pervasively religious institutions so they can
allegedly provide social services. Let me comment on a couple words
I used in framing the issue because they lead directly to the heart of
the matter.
A. These constitutional dilemmas arise only with pervasively
sectarian institutions, not religiously affiliated institutions
First, I noted that the issue concerns "pervasively religious
institutions." Neither the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
nor other critics of these programs have any objection to taxpayer
funding of religiously-affiliated institutions, such as Catholic
Charities or Lutheran Social Services. These organizations are
sufficiently independent of their affiliated religious namesakes
because they have secular missions, adhere to general regulations that
are imposed on all recipients of government funds, and promote
1. This Article is an edited version of the oral remarks that Professor Strossen
prepared for delivery at the 2005 Thomas M. Cooley Law School Symposium,
World Views Collide, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV 443 (2006). Credit and responsibility
for some of the footnotes belong to her Chief Aide, Steven C. Cunningham (N.Y.
Law School '99) along with her Research Assistants, Samantha Fredrickson (N.Y.
Law School '08) and Jennifer Rogers (N.Y. Law School '07). Most of the credit
and responsibility for most of the footnotes belong to the staff of the Cooley Law
Review, to whom Prof. Strossen conveys her gratitude.
2. Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil
Liberties Union.
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constitutional values of equality and government neutrality toward
religion. 3 Most importantly, these religiously-affiliated institutions
adhere to prohibitions on discrimination in choosing employees or
clients; they also adhere to prohibitions on religious proselytizing
with government funds.
4
In contrast, pervasively religious institutions cannot adhere to
such conditions, and should not have to do so, consistent with their
religious liberty. For example, as a condition of receiving government
funding, Catholic Charities must hire and serve anyone who is
otherwise eligible, regardless of factors such as religion, gender, or
sexual orientation.5 However, for the Catholic Church itself, such
kinds of discrimination are mandated by religious beliefs.6 For
example, the Catholic Church, as a matter of church doctrine, bars
women and gay men from serving as priests.7
For the foregoing reasons, if the government gave money to the
Catholic Church for social services, some important rights would
inevitably be violated. This is the basic, inescapable dilemma that is
posed by government funding of any sectarian institution to provide
social services. 8 I will illustrate the general problem by referring to a
3. See Catholic Charities U.S.A., About Us, http://www
catholiccharitiesusa.org/about/index.cftn?cfid=7616202&cftoken=57950072 (last
visited July 23, 2006); Lutheran Social Services, Inc., About Us,
http://www.lsss.org/aboutus.htm (last visited July 23, 2006); Lutheran Social
Services, Inc., Credentials, http://www.lsss.org/mediareleases/mediacredentials
.htm (last visited July 23, 2006).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a (g), (j) (2000).
5. See § 604a (g); Melissa McClellan, Faith and Federalism: Do Charitable
Choice Provisions Preempt State Nondiscrimination Employment Laws?, 61 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1437, 1446 (2004) (discussing the charitable choice provisions in the
1996 Welfare Reform Act).
6. See Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts to Define Religion: The Ramifications of
Applying Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to Religious
Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 741, 755-56 (2005) (discussing how
narrow definitions of a religious employer ignore the pervasiveness of the Catholic
religious mission and teachings).
7. Jan Curry, The Law of Celibacy Must Change,
http://www.womenpriests.org/wijnga-l/currie.asp (last visited July 23, 2006); Ian
Fisher & Laurie Goodstein, In Strong Terms, Rome is to Ban Gays as Priests, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at Al (reporting that a Vatican document published in
November 2005 excluded gay men from the priesthood and pronounced that
candidates who "are actively homosexual, have deep-seated homosexual tendencies,
or support the so-called 'gay culture[].' are banned from the priesthood).
8. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1988) (citing Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
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church, but the same problem would exist with a synagogue, temple,
mosque, or any other sectarian institution.
On the one hand, if the church is subject to the same regulations as
other recipients of government funds, then it will be barred from
discriminating on the basis of religion or other criteria in choosing its
employees and clients.9 It will also be barred from engaging in
religious proselytizing while providing social services. These
regulations are needed to protect the religious liberty and equality
rights of the employees and clients of the church's social service
programs. 1 But these regulations would undermine the church's own
religious liberty rights.'
2
On the other hand, if the government exempted the church from
non-discrimination and non-proselytizing regulations, then the
religious liberty and equality rights of the employees and clients of
the church's social service programs would be violated.' 3 And it
would also violate the religious liberty and equality rights of all
taxpayers to be forced to fund a religious institution whose beliefs
they do not share and which engages in discrimination.' 4 It is one
thing for members and supporters of a church to choose voluntarily to
contribute to it. Making that choice is a person's own First Amend-
ment right. However, as taxpayers, we all have a right to ensure that
our government is not using our funds to support institutions that
engage in discrimination. 15
B. Government may fund only secular social services,
not religious proselytizing
Second, let me clarify a second word that I used in my statement
of the issue: I said that proponents of government-funded religion
seek to divert our tax dollars to pervasively religious organizations
that "allegedly" provide social services. The adverb "allegedly"
9. See § 604a (g), (j).
10. Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe,
Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 771, 820 (2001) (discussing government regulation of religious entities under
school voucher plans and charitable choice plans).
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. But see supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
14. See Lupu, supra note 10, at 779.
15. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592-95 (1983).
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underscores that some pervasively religious institutions take our tax
money to provide religious services rather than secular social services.
Many sad stories have come to light that illustrate this problem.
One recent example is the only vocational training program for prison
inmates in Bradford County, Pennsylvania. In 2005, the ACLU
challenged the program because a significant portion of the inmates'
time was spent on compulsory religious lectures and prayer, rather
than on learning job skills. 16 As one ACLU lawyer on the case, Mary
Catherine Roper, stated:
Incarcerated men and women should not have to [be] subject[ed]
... to religious proselytizing in order to get the skills they need to
reenter the workforce . . . . Giving public dollars to private
groups to teach inmates job skills... is an important part of this
country's social safety net, but using taxpayer dollars to convert a
captive audience is unconstitutional.
17
Let me cite just one more example of these many disturbing
situations: A case that the ACLU is handling right here in Michigan.
It started in 2001, when our client, nineteen-year-old Joseph Hanas,
pled guilty to a charge of marijuana possession.18  The court
sentenced him to a drug rehabilitation program run by the Pentecostal
Church, known as the "Inner City Christian Outreach Residential
Program."'19 It turned out that one of the program's goals was to
convert Mr. Hanas from Catholicism to Pentecostalism.20 "He was
forced to read the [B]ible for seven hours a day and was tested on
Pentecostal principles. The staff also told him that Catholicism was a
form of witchcraft and they confiscated both his rosary and Holy
Communion prayer book."2  He was threatened that if he did not do
what the pastor told him, he would be thrown out of the program and
sent to prison.22 The program director actually told Mr. Hanas's aunt
that he "gave up his right of freedom of religion when he was placed
16. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Pennsylvania Jail Requires
Religion with Rehabilitation, ACLU Charges (Feb. 17, 2005),
http://aclu.org/religion/govtfunding/16246prs20050217.html.
17. Id.
18. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, ACLU Files
Lawsuit in Defense of Catholic Man Coerced to Convert (Dec. 6, 2005),
http://aclumich.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=449.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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into this program.', 23 During the seven weeks that Mr. Hanas was in
this purported drug treatment program, he received no drug treatment
whatsoever. 24 That was not surprising because not a single one of the
program's staff members was a certified or trained drug counselor.
25
The Detroit News ran a powerful editorial criticizing this case as
emblematic of the inherent problems with faith-based funding. 26 Its
headline says it all: Religious Coercion in Michigan Case Shows
Government Should be Wary of Faith-Based Programs.27 Let me
quote just a few lines from this editorial:
Programs like the one Hanas found himself in are common. In
fact, these are the kind of programs that President Bush funded
when he was governor of Texas; drug addiction is treated as a sin
and Bible study is provided as treatment.
It is also the kind of program that Bush wants to fund under his
faith-based initiatives, in which religious indoctrination is dressed
up to look like social welfare.
While faith-based programs may be well-motivated and
helpful for some, it is not appropriate for the government to fund
them or coerce people to participate in them.
28
Such government-funded religious indoctrination is doubly-
flawed: It deprives needy people of the professional services that
would effectively help them; and, to add insult to injury, it deprives
these same needy, vulnerable people of their precious religious liberty
and freedom of conscience by subjecting them to coercive conversion
efforts.29
C. Religious leaders oppose government funding ofpervasively
sectarian institutions out of concern for religious liberty
When the government funds a pervasively sectarian institution,
there is no solution to the problem of proselytization that respects the
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Wendy Wagenheim, Op-Ed., Religious Coercion in Michigan Case Shows
Government Should be Wary of Faith-Based Programs, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 27,
2004, at A9.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, supra note
18.
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religious liberty of all concerned, just as there is no such solution to
the problem of discrimination. The government could protect the
rights of the clients of sectarian institutions against coercive,
harassing proselytization, as it could prevent problems of
discrimination by such institutions, by monitoring those institutions
and their social service programs. This kind of monitoring, though,
would endanger the institutions' religious liberty and autonomy.
In short, the solution to one violation of religious liberty in turn
creates another violation of religious liberty. Here is how that
dilemma was described by a coalition of many religious leaders and
institutions, called "The Coalition Against Religious Discrimination":
"Any 'safeguards' [against discrimination or indoctrination] will be
totally unworkable-how will [they] be enforced? Will [we create] a
new federal Church Police . : . to monitor these programs? Will
churches want their books subject to audit after audit by the
government?"
30
In light of these insoluble dilemmas, it is not surprising that many
diverse religious institutions and leaders have opposed government
funding and instead have championed the system that has worked so
well for so long: Government funding instead of social service
agencies that are only affiliated with religious institutions, but
independent of them. 31 Given such independence, religiously
affiliated social service agencies can be subject to the same anti-
discrimination and anti-proselytizing regulations that bind other
recipients of government funds, and, hence, respect the equality and
religious freedom rights of their employees and clients, without
violating their own religious freedom.
The complaint that "faith-based funding" would subject religious
institutions to intrusive government monitoring has even come from
religious leaders who are strong supporters of President Bush, for
whom this has been a pet issue. For example, speaking on his 700
Club television show in 2001, Pat Robertson said that "what seems to
be such a great initiative can rise up to bite the [government-funded
religious] organizations as well as the... government." 32 Robertson
further stated: "[Flederal rules will envelope these [religious]
30. Beth Corbin, Action Alerts-Your Help is Needed Now (Mar. 7, 2001),
http://glinn.com/news/actalert.htm.
31. See Rob Boston, Love for Sale: Faith-Based Grant Buys TV Preacher's
Favor, Americans United for Separation of Church and State (Feb. 2, 2005),
http://blog.au.org/2005/02/love-for-sale-f.html.
32. Id.
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organizations, they'll begin to be nurtured... on federal money, and
then they can't get off of it. It'll be like a narcotic.1
33
In sum, government funding of pervasively sectarian institutions
involves important issues of equality and non-discrimination, as well
as religious liberty and freedom of conscience. However, Sam asked
me to focus on the Establishment Clause issues, consistent with the
overall symposium theme.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ABSOLUTELY BARS ALL
GOVERNMENT FUNDING OF RELIGION
A. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris was a narrow ruling that
violated this absolute bar
In 2002, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,34 the Supreme Court
narrowly rejected, by a 5-4 vote, an Establishment Clause challenge to
one particular faith-based funding program: Cleveland's school
voucher 3program, which channeled massive tax support to sectarian
schools.35 The majority based its holding that the Cleveland program
complied with the Establishment Clause on six specific aspects of that
program. 36 Accordingly, it is unlikely that the Court would uphold
any other school voucher program, let alone other forms of
government aid to religious institutions, if they did not comply with
all of these six criteria. In contrast, the four dissenting Justices
compellingly explained why all government funding of sectarian
institutions inherently violates core Establishment Clause principles.
37
The Zelman ruling was the first time the Court departed from what
it had long held to be a core tenet of the Establishment Clause: Its
absolute bar on any government funding of any religious institution,
including funding that is part of a broad and evenhanded benefits
program 8
33. Id.
34. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
35. Id. at 643-44.
36. Id. at 649-52 (holding that (t) a voucher program must be completely neutral
with respect to religion; (2) use of vouchers at a religious institution must be a
wholly genuine and independent private choice; (3) the vouchers must pass directly
through the hands of the beneficiaries; (4) the voucher program must not provide
incentives to choose a religious institution over a non-religious one; (5) the program
must provide genuine secular options; and (6) the program must have a secular
purpose).
37. Id. at 686-717 (Souter, J., dissenting).
38. See id. at 686-87.
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This absolute bar is supported not only by the Court's consistent
rulings throughout more than half a century, 39 but also by con-
stitutional history,40 by the purposes underlying the Establishment
Clause, 41 and by scholars across a broad ideological spectrum.42
B. This absolute bar is supported by constitutional history
The relevant pre-constitutional history is well-summarized by
University of Texas Law Professor Douglas Laycock, as follows:
[1]f the debates of the 1780's support any proposition, it is that
the Framers opposed government financial support for religion...
They did not substitute small taxes for large taxes; three pence
was as bad as any larger sum. The principle was what mattered.
With respect to money, religion was to be wholly voluntary.
Churches either would support themselves or they would not, but
the government would neither help nor interfere.
Professor Laycock's reference to "three pence," of course, is an
allusion to one of James Madison's famous lines in his influential
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.
44
Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance" played the key role in
defeating a Virginia bill that would have allowed taxpayers to
designate any religious or educational institution as the beneficiary of
their assessed taxes.45 In a central passage, which was widely cited in
the founding era and has often been cited in modem Supreme Court
decisions, 46 Madison posed the following rhetorical question to
39. Id. at 687-90; see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Everson v. Bd. of. Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279, 284 (2001).
40. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 707-08 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also ROBERT S.
ALLEY, JAMES MADIsON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 213 (1985).
41. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 605 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
42. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 39, at 281.
43. Douglas Laycock, "'Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About
Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875, 921, 923 (1985-86).
44. JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUs LIBERTY 55, 57 (Robert S. Alley
ed., Prometheus Books 1985) (1785).
45. Political and Religious Life in Eighteenth-Century Virginia, Library of
Congress American Memory, http://rs6.loc.gov/ammem/repehtml/rpessay.htmi (last
visited July 23, 2006).
46. Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305 n. 15
(1986); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 n.31 (1977); Lemon v.
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underscore the absolute principle at stake, essential to individual
liberty: "Who does not see that .. the same authority which can
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the
support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any
other establishment in all cases whatsoever?
' 47
The principles set out in Madison's "Memorial and Remon-
strance" not only led to the defeat of the Virginia tax bill for general
support of religious and educational institutions; it also spurred the
adoption of Thomas Jefferson's Virginia Statute of Religious
Liberty.48
Along with Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance," Jefferson's
Bill is also considered authoritative in shaping and interpreting the
Constitution's religion clauses. 49 Two key passages in that famous
document, which also have been widely quoted, further demonstrate
the primacy of the no-government-funding principle. First, the Bill's
Preamble declares that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of
money for the propaation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful
and tyrannical ....". Second, its text provides that "no man shall be
compelled to . . . support any religious worship, place, or ministry
whatsoever ....
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 633-34 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 779 n.4
(1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
47. MADISON, supra note 44, at 57.
48. Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty (Jan. 16, 1786), in DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 125-26 (Henry S. Commager ed., 9th ed. 1973) (1786); see
also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878).
49. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947)
This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the
First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison
and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the same objective
and were intended to provide the same protection against
governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute.
Id, (citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164; Watson
v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871)).
50. Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty, supra note 48, at 125-26.
51. Id.
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C. This absolute bar is supported by the purposes underlying the
Establishment Clause
The Framers' absolute opposition to government funding of
religion reflected three core objectives that animated the First Amend-
ment's non-Establishment Clause.
1. To protect individual freedom of conscience
The first such objective is to protect individual freedom of con-
science. Indeed some experts consider this to be the Clause's fore-
most objective.5 This paramount goal certainly resonated throughout
Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance" and Jefferson's Virginia
Statute of Religious Liberty, especially in the passages quoted
above.53 This commitment to individual freedom of conscience was
so strong that, Jefferson maintained, government could not tax
individuals even for the purpose of funding religious institutions of
their own faith, since that would "deprive[e]" the individual "of the
comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor,
whose morals he would make his pattern. 54
2. To preserve the purity of religion
A second major Establishment Clause objective was to preserve
religion and religious institutions from what Madison decried as the
"degrad[ing]" influence of government. 55 Roger Williams and other
devout religious leaders in the colonial era recognized that even what
might seem to be beneficial government involvement with religion,
including tax support, in fact would undermine religion's indepen-
dence and vitality.56 As Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance"
noted, government support of religion "is a contradiction to the
Christian Religion itself, for every pae of it disavows a dependence
on the powers of this world . . . ." In 1947, in the Court's first
modem Establishment Clause case, Justice Rutledge elaborated on
52. Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the
Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REv. 673, 675 (2002).
53. See supra notes 44, 48 and accompanying text.
54. Hening, Statutes of Virginia 84 (1823); Henry Steele Commager,
Documents of American History 125 (1944).
55. Id.
56. See Feldman, supra note 52, at 689.
57. See MADISON, supra note 44, at 57.
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Madison's point as follows: "The great condition of religious liberty
is that it be maintained free from sustenance, as also from other
interferences, by the state. For when it comes to rest upon that secular
foundation it vanishes with the resting."
58
Many current religious leaders and citizens have echoed this con-
cern when arguing against government-funded support of religion.
59
For example, vouchers for religious schools and other forms of "faith-
based funding" have been opposed by no less staunch a stalwart of the
so-called "Religious Right" than the Georgia and Texas chapters of
Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum.60 The Georgia Eagle Forum's news-
letter warned: "Because [government funding] brings . . . religion-
restricting government regulations, many . . . religions . . . know
better than to hand over control of their social service ministries to the
government." 61 Likewise, the Texas Eagle Forum newsletter warned
that vouchers "would destroy private education," 62 including private
religious schools, gradually expunging religion from their curricula.63
In past Supreme Court decisions reaffirming the core Establish-
ment Clause ban on government funding of religion, Justices have
stressed the goal of avoiding "corrosive secularism." 64 That theme
58. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
59. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Prominent Chicago
Religious Leaders Applaud Court Order Ending Pentagon's Special Funding for
Boy Scout Jamboree (July 7, 2005),
http://www.aclu.org/religion/govtfunding/19899prs20050707.html; Interview with
C. Wetton Geddy, The Jesus Factor (Mar. 4, 2005),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ esus/interviews/gaddy.html; Peter
S. Berg, Statement Against Charitable Choice Proposals (Nov. 3, 1999),
http://www.tfn.org/faithnetwork/advocacy/faithbased/rabbistmt/index.php.
60. See Cathie Adams, Vouchers: The Parent Trap, 6(3) TORCH (Texas Eagle
Forum) (Mar. 1999), http://texaseagle.org/torch/03-99.html.; Ella Deadwyler, Faith-
Based Initiative Passes Georgia Senate 40-14, Goes to House, GA. EAGLE FORUM
(Ga. Insight), Jan. 23, 2004, available at
http://www.georgiaeagle.org/?where=insight&ID-78.
61. Deadwyler, supra note 60.
62. Adams, supra note 60; see also Jonathan Rauch, Vouchers: A Liberal Plot
to Destroy Private Schools, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Dec. 23, 2000,
http://reason.com/rauch/00 12 23.shtml; Laurence M. Vance, The Great Voucher
Fraud, (Mar. 28, 2005), http://lewrockwell.com/vance/vance38.html.
63. See Rauch, supra note 62; see also Vance, supra note 62; Thomas C. Berg,
Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional Questions, 72 U. CIN. L.
REV. 151 (2003).
64. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 608 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985).
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continued to be stressed by the dissenters in the Zelman case,65 which
for the first time violated the hitherto absolute no-funding principle.
66
As Justice Souter observed in his powerful dissent from the Court's 5-
4 ruling in that case, "When government aid goes up, so does reliance
on it; the only thing likely to go down is independence.... [One]
wonder[s] when dependence will become great enough to give the
State . . . an effective veto over basic decisions on the content of
curriculums?',
7
The Ohio voucher program that Zelman upheld attached regula-
tory conditions that are typical of conditions we can reasonably antici-
pate being imposed on all government funding programs because they
reflect widely held values.68 Yet these values are inconsistent with
many religious beliefs, thus endangering the religious liberty of
religious recipients of government "largesse." 69 The Ohio voucher
program barred any religious schools that received government funds
from "discriminat[ing] on the basis of. . . religion" and also from
"teach[inj hatred of any person or group on the basis of . . .
religion." As Justice Souter's dissent noted, the anti-discrimination
provision could mean that "a participating religious school may well
be forbidden to choose a member of its own clergy to serve as teacher
or principal over a layperson of a different religion claiming equal
qualification. "7  Likewise, the anti-hate-speech regulation "could be
understood ... to prohibit religions from teaching traditionally legiti-
mate articles of faith as to the error, sinfulness, or ignorance of
others."
72
3. To avoid conflict among religious groups
The third major objective underlying the Establishment Clause
also supports its categorical ban on government funding: To avoid
the conflict and strife among various religious groups that have torn
apart so many societies throughout history and around the world,
65. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 712 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
66. Id. at 707-16 (Souter, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 715.
68. See id. at 645.
69. Id. at 712 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 645 (quoting OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(6) (West Supp.
2002)).
71. Id. at 712-13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 713.
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including through actual violence. 73 As Justice Rutledge warned back
in 1947:
Public money devoted to payment of religious costs ... brings
the quest for more. It brings too the struggle of sect against sect
for the larger share or for any. Here one [religious sect], by
numbers [of adherents] alone will benefit most, there another.
That is precisely the history of societies which have had an
established religion and dissident groups.74
This general danger is very evident in the specific context of the
Cleveland voucher program that the Court narrowly upheld in
Zelman.75 As Justice Breyer warned in his dissent in that case:
Why will different religions not become concerned about, and
seek to influence, the criteria used to channel this money to
religious schools? Why will they not want to examine the im-
plementation of the programs that provide this money-to
determine, for example, whether implementation has biased a
program toward or against particular sects, or whether recipient
religious schools are adequately fulfilling a program's criteria? If
so, just how is the State to resolve the resulting controversies
without provoking legitimate fears of the kinds of religious
favoritism that, in so religiously diverse a Nation, threaten social
dissension?
76
Justice Breyer's dissent thus shows that the government regulation
that inevitably accompanies government funding violates the second
Establishment Clause objective: To protect religion from "corrosive
secularism." 77 This government regulation also threatens the Clause's
third objective: Avoiding religious divisiveness. Justice Souter
explained this downside of government funding of religion in the
following general terms:
Religious teaching at taxpayer expense simply cannot be
cordoned from taxpayer politics, and every major religion
currently espouses social positions that provoke intense opposi-
tion. Not all taxpaying Protestant citizens, for example, will be
content to underwrite the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church
condemning the death penalty. Nor will all of America's
Muslims acquiesce in paying for the endorsement of the religious
73. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1947).
74. Id. at 53-54 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
75. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 723-24 (Souter, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 723-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
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Zionism taught in many religious Jewish schools .... Nor will
every secular taxpayer be content to support Muslim views on
differential treatment of the sexes, or... to fund the espousal of a
wife's obligation of obedience to her husband, presumably taught
in any schools adopting the articles of faith of the Southern
Baptist Convention. Views like these ... have been safe in the
sectarian pulpits and classrooms of this Nation not only because
the Free Exercise Clause protects them directly, but [also]
because the ban on supporting religious establishment has
protected free exercise, by keeping it relatively private. With the
arrival of [government financing,] . .. that privacy will go, and
along with it will go confidence that religious disagreement will
stay moderate.78
This general concern was certainly concretely manifest in the
Cleveland voucher program. 79 Recall the state's requirement men-
tioned above, that no recipient parochial school may "teach hatred" or
advocate lawlessness.80 As one of the amicus briefs in that case noted,
"'[I]t is difficult to imagine a more divisive activity' than the appoint-
ment of state officials as referees to determine whether a particular
religious doctrine 'teaches hatred or advocates lawlessness. '
8 1
Justice Breyer offered the following specific examples of this problem
under the Ohio voucher program:
How are state officials to adjudicate claims that one religion or
another is advocating, for example, civil disobedience in response
to unjust laws, the use of illegal drugs in a religious ceremony, or
resort to force to call attention to what it views as an immoral
social practice? What kind of public hearing will there be in
response to claims that one religion or another is continuing to
teach a view of history that casts members of other religions in
the worst possible light? . . .[A]ny major funding program....
will require criteria. And the selection of those criteria, as well as
their application, inevitably pose problems that are divisive.82
To be sure, it would be an especially egregious Establishment
Clause violation if the government singled out religion in general, or
78. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 715-16 (Souter, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 649-55.
80. Id. at 713 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3313.976(A)(6) (West Supp. 2002)).
81. Id. at 724 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Nat'l Comm. for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae 23, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (No. 00-
1751)).
82. Id. at 724-25.
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any particular religion, for preferential funding, above and beyond the
funding available to other generally comparable institutions." None-
theless, an evenhanded funding program that included religion among
other generally comparable beneficiaries would still fall afoul of the
absolute funding bar regarding religion.
84
D. This absolute bar is supported by the Court's consistent rulings
throughout more than half a century
Until the Court's 5-4 Zelman decision in 2002, a majority con-
tinued to recognize that evenhandedness of government funding pro-
grams, as between religious and non-religious recipients, was
necessary for constitutionality, but not sufficient.85 As Justice Souter
wrote in 1995:
Evenhandedness as one element of a permissibly attenuated
benefit is ...a far cry from evenhandedness as a sufficient
condition of constitutionality for direct financial support of
religious proselytization, and our cases have unsurprisingly
repudiated any such attempt to cut the Establishment Clause
down to a mere prohibition against unequal direct aid.1
6
In fact, until 2002, the Court repeatedly struck down government
aid programs that benefited religious institutions, despite the fact that
the programs were broad and evenhanded, including nonreligious
institutions as well as religious ones. Regardless of what other institu-
tions were also aided, these programs were unconstitutional by virtue
of their prohibited purpose or effect of financially supporting the
religious mission of religious institutions.8 7 As noted previously, the
lineage of this longstanding line of cases goes back to the Constitu-
tion's intellectual roots, including Madison's influential "Memorial
and Remonstrance., 8 8 New York University Law School Professor
Noah Feldman summarizes the pertinent intellectual history this way:
All attempts to use government resources to institutionalize
religious practices countermand the American tradition of
83. See generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
84. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
85. See id. at 839.
86. Id. at 882 (Souter, J., dissenting).
87. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 878-99 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting);
see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1972); Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
88. See supra Part II.B.
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nonestablishment, grounded historically in the belief that
government has no authority over religious matters. When
government funds social programs under the rubric of charitable
choice, the programs must not'. . rely on faith to accomplish
their goals, or else the government is institutionally sponsoring
the religious mission.
89
E. This absolute bar is supported by scholars across a broad
ideological spectrum
It is noteworthy that scholars across a broad ideological spectrum
concur that a core meaning of the Establishment Clause today must
continue to be its longstanding bar on government financing of
religion.90 That is true, for instance, even of Michael McConnell-
now a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit-who has famously advocated a substantially narrowed
understanding of the Establishment Clause.9' Yet, even his limited
concept of government action that violates the Establishment Clause
extends to "legal compulsion to support" religious activities through
taxes.
92
89. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE
PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 247 (2005).
90. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 39, at 281-82; see, e.g., Donald L. Beschle,
Does the Establishment Clause Matter? Non-Establishment Principles in the United
States and Canada, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 451, 451 (2002) ("Accommodationists...
argue that the Establishment Clause bars . . . direct financial support of purely
religious activity by religious bodies .... [S]eparationists contend that the clause
bars ... financial assistance to religious groups."); Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the
Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REv. 807, 839-40 (1999)
("Facially neutral voucher schemes posit a potential mingling of church-state power
that should make anyone-including voucher supporters-step back for a minute.");
see also Church-State Relations, American Jewish Committee (Mar. 15, 2006),
http://www.ajc.org ("The concept of 'charitable choice' . . . inappropriately seeks to
expand the terms under which governmental funds are made available to faith-based
social service providers. AJC opposes charitable choice because it sanctions the
funding of religious institutions.., violating the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the Constitution."); Oliver Thomas, Partnership or Peril? Faith-
Based Initiatives and the First Amendment, 2 FIRST REPORTS 1, 2 (2001), available
at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/about.aspx?id=6265 ("Key to the notion of
no establishment is the principle that tax dollars should not be diverted to religious
uses. As Thomas Jefferson put it, taxing people for the support of religion is 'sinful
and tyrannical."') (footnote omitted).
91. See Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (Special Issue: Religion & the State, 1985-86).
92. Id. at 938 ("[L]egal compulsion to support or participate in religious
activities would seem to be the essence of an establishment.").
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I will cite just one more example: New York University Law
School Professor, Noah Feldman, who advocates another variation on
McConnell's theme of a radically reduced Establishment Clause.
93
Feldman urges shrinking the Establishment Clause by substituting
"the two guiding rules that historically lay at the core of' our Con-
stitution's treatment of religion.94 The first core principle is "no
coercion," and the second is "no money."95 Concerning the second
principle-no money-Feldman advocates the following absolute
rule: The state may not "expend its resources so as to support
religious institutions and practices." 96
III. CONCLUSION
I will conclude by quoting a statement that well summarizes the
problems that plague any government funding of religious institutions
to provide social services. While it is not phrased in formal
constitutional law terminology, it nevertheless conveys constitutional
concerns about the religious liberty of institutions and individuals
alike. Moreover, although this statement is completely consistent
with the ACLU's views on these issues, in fact, it was written by the
Georgia Eagle Forum, which proudly describes itself as a
"conservative and pro-family" group.97 The Georgia Eagle Forum
wrote that a government-funded program is:
[B]ad news for.., religions that are taken in by the promise of
more money to expand their ministries. In reality, it will expand
government control of social services, [and] shrink religious
influence ....
... [I]t's not good for religion, our country or the people who
need help.98
93. FELDMAN, supra note 89, at 237.
94. Id.
95. Id. These two principles are mutually independent, so government funding
would be banned, even if it is not coercive.
96. Id.
97. Mission, GA. EAGLE FORUM, http://www.georgiaeagle.org.
98. Deadwyler, supra note 60.
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